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NOTES
the plea to be made as of right up to the time of trial.16 The
statute of that state, however, clearly distinguishes the plea from
those which must be made at arraignment and the case law turns
on that point.17
It is believed that State v. Watts erroneously removed the in-
sanity plea from the pattern established in the Code articles.
A judicial reversal of the Watts case could be accomplished con-
veniently in view of the fact that the language of article 267
relied on by the court has been repealed. 18 An alternative solu-
tion to the problem lies in amending article 265 as follows:
"The defendant may at any time, with the consent of the
court, withdraw his plea of not guilty and then set up some
other plea to the merits, or file some preliminary plea such
as a demurrer or motion to quash the indictment."
The amended article would specifically include every change
which could be made from a plea of not guilty. If there were a
valid reason why an insanity plea was not made at arraignment,
the judge would have to permit the plea under penalty of re-
versal.1 9 But if the delay were merely a dilatory tactic, the de-
fendant would forfeit his right to the insanity defense.
Jessie Anne Lennan
LABOR LAW - UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES - UNION DUTY To
BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH - "HARASSING TACTICS"
Company and defendant union were negotiating for a new
collective bargaining contract to replace the old contract when it
expired. Negotiations were held without evidence of a "take it
or leave it" attitude on the part of the union at the bargaining
table. The union, nevertheless, had its members engage in slow-
downs, unauthorized extensions of rest periods, and walkouts
(1914) ; Morell v. State, 136 Ala. 44, 34 So. 208 (1903); Sheppard v. State,
257 Ala. 626, 60 So.2d 329 (1952) ; California: People v. Yonng, 26 Cal.App.2d
613, 80 P.2d 138 (1938); Colorado: Mendy v. People, 105 Colo. 547, 100 P.2d
584 (1940) ; Wa8hington: State v. McLain, 199 Wash. 664, 92 P.2d 875 (1939).
16. Indiana: IND. REV. STAT. § 9-1701 (1933).
17. Swain v. State, 215 Ind. 259, 18 N.E.2d 921 (1939); Barber v. State,
197 Ind. 88, 149 N.E. 896 (1925).
18. See note 10 supra.
19. See note 14 supra. The validity of a reason would be determined by the
court. The writer suggests that if the defendant did not have counsel at arraign-




or partial strikes for portions of shifts or entire shifts; induced
employees of other concerns not to perform work for the com-
pany; and refused to permit work during special hours, or over-
time. The company filed a complaint before the NLRB, con-
tending that these "harassing tactics" constituted a refusal to
bargain in good faith and thus were a union unfair labor prac-
tice under section 8 (b) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The union
responded that its conduct was an unprohibited form of economic
pressure in the collective bargaining process. The NLRB in a
unanimous decision ordered the union to cease and desist this
conduct and the union appealed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held, order set aside. "There
is not the slightest inconsistency between genuine desire to come
to an agreement and use of economic pressure to get the kind
of agreement one wants." Since the union could have totally
withheld its services by calling a strike without violating its
duty to bargain in good faith, a partial withholding of services
in order to put economic pressure on the employer is permissible
and is not a union unfair labor practice.1 Textile Workers Union
v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Under the Wagner Act, only employers were subject to the
unfair labor practice charge of a refusal to bargain collectively.2
This provision was interpreted to require that the employer
must confer in good faithA With the adoption of the Taft-
Hartley amendments, a refusal to bargain collectively was also
made a union unfair labor practice. 4 In addition, the phrase
"to bargain collectively" was statutorily defined to include the
same good faith requirement.5 A single standard of what con-
stitutes good faith is therefore indicated for both employer and
employees, and decisions applying the principle to employers
1. The NLRB had also found that the union had threatened employees with
"reprisals" for working overtime and for giving testimony in the proceedings before
the Board, and had blocked plant entrances so as to prevent ingress and egress of
employees, The part of the NLRB's order to cease and desist from these practices
was based on section 8(b) (1) (a) of the act, which makes restraint and coercion
of employees by a union an unfair labor practice. The union did not contest this
part of the order, and the court left it undisturbed.
2. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1946).
3. Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
4. 61 STAT. 140(b) (3) (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1952).
5. "For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet together at reasonable times and [to] confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, . . . but such obli-
gation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession." 61 STAT. 140(d) (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
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may be used as significant guideposts in determining the re-
sponsibility of unions. 6 Lack of good faith is usually based on a
pattern of conduct rather than on a single act.7 The test to de-
termine what constitutes good faith seems to be whether or not
there is an intent or a desire to reach an agreement.8 The most
common union bad faith bargaining has been found in union
insistence, as a condition precedent to bargaining, that the em-
ployer agree to a provision made unlawful by the amended act.9
No case found has held that a union is guilty of a refusal to
bargain in good faith because of a strike.
The decision of the instant case is that the harassing tactics
employed by the union do not constitute the unfair labor prac-
tice of a refusal to bargain in good faith. The conduct is de-
scribed as economic pressure unregulated by the act. The ma-
jority opinion relied on the International Union, UAWA case' 0
in which the Supreme Court upheld state regulation of similar
activity on the ground that Congress had not regulated this kind
of conduct." The dissent in the instant case stressed the "un-
protected" nature of the harassing tactics, that is, the employer
has not been held to commit an unfair labor practice in dis-
charging or taking retaliatory action against employees who
engage in "harassing tactics.' 2 The dissenting judge felt that
6. National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 980 (1948).
7. Reed and Prince Manufacturing Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951) ; I.B.S. Manu-
facturing Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1951).
8. NLRB v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 713, 723 (3d Cir. 1939) ; NLRB v.
Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941). For a discussion written shortly
after the Taft-Hartley amendments on what characteristics of negotiations con-
stitute good or bad faith, see Note, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1224 (1948). For a recent
discussion of the duty to bargain in good faith, see Dupres and Golden, The Duty
To Bargain, U. ILL. L. FoRuMt, Spring 1955, pp. 1, 44.
9. International Union, UMW, 83 N.L.R.B. 916 (1949) (unauthorized union
shop); Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1949) (closed-
shop) National Maritime Union of America, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1949) (hiring hall
practice).
10. International Union, UAWA, AFL, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949), Justices Douglas, Black, Rutledge, and
Murphy dissenting.
11. Id. at 264. "We think that this recurrent or intermittent unannounced
stoppage of work to win unstated ends was neither forbidden by federal statute nor
was it legalized and approved thereby. Such being the case, the state police power
was not superseded by congressional Act over a subject normally within its ex-
clusive power and reachable by federal regulation only because of its effects on
that interstate commerce which Congress may regulate. Labor Board v. Jones and
Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Board, 330 U.S. 767.
"We find no basis for denying to Wisconsin the power, in governing her in-
ternal affairs, to regulate a course of conduct neither made a right under federal
law nor a violation of it and which has the coercive effect obvious in this device."
(Emphasis added.)
12. Such action has been upheld in the following cases: NLRB v. Electrical
Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) ("disloyal" attack on employer's product) ; South-
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the harassing tactics of the employees in this case, considered
with the other evidence offered, 13 was enough to constitute a
refusal to bargain in good faith. To the dissenter, the case on
which the majority relied had considered only the question of
state jurisdiction to regulate harassing tactics, not the question
of whether those tactics constitute bad faith. 4
The Supreme Court in the International Union, UAWA case
commented that "it is the objective only and not the tactics
of a strike which bring it within the power of the Federal
Board."'15 The Court in that case based its decision largely upon
the fact that the NLRB had no jurisdiction because the employer
was not informed of either any specific demands or what con-
cessions could be made to avoid the union conduct. It is some-
what misleading that the court in the instant case termed the
harassing tactics "economic pressure to get the kind of agree-
ment" the union wanted,'0 because this defintion of the purpose
of the union's conduct is inconsistent with the court's recogni-
tion that the union in the instant case did not notify the em-
ployer of any specific demands.' 7 The similarity of the fact
situations of the two cases would seem to justify the decision, if
not the language, of the instant case. It could be argued that
the International Union, UAWA case should not control the
instant decision because the conduct involved in the former case
occurred in 1945 and 1946, before enactment of the Taft-Hartley
amendments.' In addition, it was there specifically found that
the NLRB had no fixed policy to apply the act to this type of
conduct,' 9 but in the instant case the court reversed a unanimous
NLRB decision. In spite of this, however, the Court in the
International Union, UAWA case considered the effect of the
Taft-Hartley amendments and held that the union was subject
to state control in that case because its conduct was "neither
ern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (strike in violation of mutiny
laws); NLRB v. Fansteel Metalurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (sitdown
strike) ; NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (strike in violation of a
collective bargaining contract); C. G. Con, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th
Cir. 1939) (refusal to work overtime) ; Terry Poultry Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1097
(1954) (leaving plant in disregard of plant rule); Pacific Telephone Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954) ("hit-and-run" or intermittent strikes) ; Elk Lumber Co.,
91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (slowdowns and "partial strikes").
13. See note 1 Aupra.
14. 227 F.2d 409, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
15. 336 U.S. 245, 263 (1949).
16. 227 F.2d 409, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
17. Ibid.
18. 336 U.S. 245, 249 (1949).
19. Id. at 256.
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made a right under federal law nor a violation of it. ' '2o The re-
sult of these two decisions is to define an area which is outside
the jurisdiction of the NLRB, thus tracing the reverse side of
the Garner doctrine. 21 Assuming that the decision in the instant
case is correct, employers must seek relief from "harassing
tactics" either by discharging employees or by proceeding under
state statutes. The courts may also have the problem of de-
termining what types of economic pressure by employers are
beyond the pale of the employer's duty to bargain in good faith
under section 8 (a) (5).22
John S. White, Jr.
LEGAL PROFESSION - DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS - PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Defendant attorney appeared before a United States Senate
subcommittee, but refused to answer questions relating to his
past and present membership in the Communist Party. His re-
fusal to answer was based on the protection against self-incrimi-
nation in the first and fifth amendments of the Federal Con-
stitution and sections 12 and 13 of the Declaration of Rights
of the Constitution of Florida. Subsequently, the Florida State
Attorney filed a motion to disbar defendant for misconduct and
unprofessional acts, alleging that defendant was a member of
the Communist Party and that he had refused to answer ques-
tions regarding his membership. It was also contended that
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination is evidence of
misconduct by an attorney. During the trial of the case de-
fendant was again questioned as to his communist affiliations.
He refused to answer, again claiming the privilege against self-
incrimination of the Federal and State Constitutions. The trial
court entered an order of disbarment and defendant appealed.
The Florida Supreme Court held, reversed.' "There may be cir-
cumstances under which claiming the privilege against self-
incrimination would be cause for discipline or even disbarment,
20. Id at 265.
21. Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, Local 776, 346 U.S. 48.5 (1953). In
that case, it was held that state courts may not enjoin union picketing for the
purpose of coercing employers to compel their employees to join a union, because
such conduct was regulated by section 8(b) of the act.
22. Section 8(a) provides: "lt shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer .. . (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."
1. Jones, J., dissenting.
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